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Abstract 
The use of a gender-neutral annuity divisor introduces an intra-generational redistribution from 
short-lived towards long-lived individuals; this entails a transfer of wealth from males to 
females and from low socioeconomic groups to high socioeconomic groups. With some 
subpopulations consisting of females from low socioeconomic groups (or males from high 
groups), the net effect of the redistribution is unclear. The study aims to quantify the lifetime 
income redistribution of a generic NDC system using two types of divisor—the demographic 
and the economic—to compute the amount of an initial pension. With this in mind, the 
redistribution (actuarial fairness) among subpopulations is assessed through the ratio between 
the present value of expected pensions received and contributions paid. We find that all 
subgroups of women and men with high educational attainment benefit from the use of the 
unisex demographic divisor. This paper also shows that the value of the economic divisor 
depends markedly on population composition. When mortality differentials by gender and level 
of education are considered, economic divisors are mostly driven by the longevity effect 
corresponding to gender. 
 
JEL classification: D31, H55, J11, J26 
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1. Introduction 
Notional defined contribution (NDCs) schemes have been successfully implemented since the 
mid-1990s in several European countries such as Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland and Sweden 
(Gronchi and Nistico 2006; Chłoń-Domińczak et al. 2012). They are also found in Kyrgyzstan, 
Mongolia, Russia, Greece, Egypt, while China is seriously considering the introduction of this 
NDC scheme (Holzmann et al. 2012; Holzmann 2017). 
NDC pension schemes attempt to reproduce the logic of a defined contribution pension 
plan -where the pension depends on contributions and investment returns- but within a pay-as-
you-go framework (Vidal-Meliá et al. 2010) where contributions from current workers are used 
to pay for pension benefits of current pensioners.  For this reason, these are also known as 
defined contribution unfunded pension schemes. The notional account is a virtual one that 
records individual contributions, together with the fictitious return that they generate 
throughout each contributor’s working life. The return that contributions earn is calculated 
based on a macroeconomic index that tries to reflect the financial health of the system (i.e., 
changes in salaries and GDP growth), not market returns. The account balance is called notional 
because it is only used for record keeping (i.e., the system does not invest funds as the scheme 
is based on PAYG financing). Upon reaching retirement, the accumulated notional capital is 
divided by a so-called ‘annuity divisor’ to obtain a lifelong annuity according to actuarial 
practice.   
Given that women, on average, live longer than males, this ‘annuity divisor’ could be 
designed by using gender-specific life tables. However, on the basis of gender equity, all 
countries with NDCs in place use unisex (also called gender-neutral) survival probabilities to 
compute the ‘annuity divisor’, instead of using gender-specific probabilities. These unisex 
probabilities are calculated by averaging the survival probabilities of both genders. The annuity 
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divisor – also called the demographic (annuity) divisor – takes into account the remaining 
lifetime at retirement and its value depends on unisex probabilities of survival for the retired 
cohort, discount rates and the rate of indexation of pensions. Consequently, the use of unisex 
life expectancy introduces an explicit intra-generational redistribution— income is transferred 
across groups within the same generation—from short-lived towards long-lived individuals, 
entailing a transfer of wealth from males who on average live shorter lives to females who live 
longer (Palmer 2006; Alho et al. 2013; James 2013).1 
Another element of heterogeneity in life expectancy arises from socio-economic class 
- normally assessed through income, education, or occupation. A close link between level of 
education and mortality has been well documented (Borrell et al. 1999; Huisman et al. 2004; 
Lleras-Muney 2005; Miech et al. 2011; Kaplan et al. 2014). The evidence suggests that 
mortality rates are negatively correlated with socio-economic status (i.e., individuals with 
higher socioeconomic status live longer than those belonging to lower socioeconomic groups 
and the size of mortality differences across subgroups has increased over time). In this line, 
Whitehouse and Zaidi (2008) and Ayuso et al. (2016) provide comprehensive reviews of 
mortality differentials across socioeconomic groups and the implications of heterogeneity for 
pension reform and design. However, the net effect of income redistribution between 
subpopulations considering both gender and socioeconomic status is not clear for some 
subgroups, such as females with low socioeconomic status or men with high socioeconomic 
status. 
Although the evaluation of redistributive effects on the pension system has attracted 
wide attention among scholars, there has been little recent literature on lifetime income 
 
1 It is worth pointing out that, even in the case of gender-specific survival probabilities, redistribution would 
always exist from shorter-lived towards longer-lived individuals. 
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redistribution under an NDC scheme.2 Several studies focus on the comparison of distributional 
impacts between the old defined benefit and the new NDC scheme.3 Also, other related 
researches investigate the income redistribution occurring from mortality differentials across 
subpopulations when annuities are priced uniformly under social insurance programmes with 
mandatory retirement saving accounts (Brown 2002, 2003; Gong and Webb 2008; Finkelstein 
et al. 2009) and collective pension schemes (Hári et al. 2006; Hoevenaars and Ponds 2008; 
Bonenkamp 2009). 
Existing literature has no in-depth analysis with respect to the magnitude and the 
direction of the intra-generational transfers under a generic NDC pension scheme, and we 
intend to fill this gap. We therefore aim to quantify the redistribution arising from the use of 
gender-neutral annuity divisors for various socioeconomic groups. In this study, each 
subpopulation is distinguished by gender and level of educational attainment to measure cross-
gender redistribution—between males and females—and inter-educational redistribution—
among individuals with different levels of education. 
The level of education attainment can capture both direct and indirect effects on 
mortality. Typically, people with a higher level of educational attainment are less likely to 
smoke, be obese or be heavy drinkers and are more likely to drive safely, live in a safe house 
or use preventive care. Hence, this group of people are likely to live longer than those with a 
lower level of education attainment (Friedman et al. 1995; Kern and Friedman 2008; Cutler 
and Lleras-Muney 2010). In addition, the level of education can be used as a proxy for an 
individual’s lifetime resources since people with higher levels of educational attainment earn, 
on average, higher incomes (Brown, 2003). The full life cycle is incorporated in the analysis, 
 
2 See the works on measuring distributional effects in the pension system, e.g., Cubeddu (2000), Börsch-Supan 
and Reil-Held (2001), Gustman and Steinmeier (2001), Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (2002), Barnay (2007), 
Cremer et al. (2010), Forteza and Ourens (2012), Le Garrec (2012), Gustman et al. (2013), Platanakis and Sutcliffe 
(2016). 
3 See Borella (2004), Borella and Coda Moscarola (2006) and Belloni and Maccheroni (2013) for the Italian case. 
5 
 
rather than annual effects, by using a particular indicator, namely the present value ratio that 
enables us to assess the expected money’s worth of participation in the pension system. Another 
relevant aspect is the analysis of the impact of the inclusion or non-inclusion of the survivor 
dividend on fairness between individuals belonging to different subgroups. 
In addition to focusing on the effect of the demographic annuity divisor related to 
remaining life expectancy, we examine the distributional impact of an alternative divisor—an 
economic annuity divisor. The economic annuity divisor reflects the expected number of years 
that the pension benefits will be disbursed rather than the number of years that a person will 
survive.  
This paper is inspired by the experience of the Swedish NDC pension scheme4 mainly 
for two main reasons (Swedish Pensions Agency (2019). First, Sweden is the only country that 
keeps track of the survivor dividend, i.e., notional account values of the deceased, and 
distributes it among the survivors of the same birth cohort. Hence, this component constitutes 
part of the accumulated notional capital used to calculate the value of the initial pensions when 
people retire. Secondly, the Swedish NDC scheme is the only one that uses the economic 
divisor— although not directly in the calculation of the initial pension— as an annuity divisor. 
In particular, the economic divisor is currently applied to the valuation of liabilities in the 
Swedish NDC scheme and is associated with the size of pensions and the expected number of 
years for which the pension will be disbursed.5 
 
4 In practice, Sweden has gone beyond the NDC system that it implemented in 2001, in the sense that an income 
statement and a balance sheet are annually published with the aim of analysing the system’s solvency. Even so, 
an automatic balancing system that reduces the growth of the liabilities is triggered if the plan is not fully solvent. 
Sweden is claimed to be the only NDC country whose pension is financially sustainable over the long term in the 
sense that it is not necessary to make changes to the contribution rate. For interested readers please see Boado-
Penas and Carlos Vidal-Meliá (2012) and Vidal-Meliá (2012) et al (2010). 
5 We acknowledge that, although the economic divisor is not related to intragenerational redistribution among 
subgroups, it is interesting to analyse its impact on the fairness of the different subgroups in the population. Also, 
understanding the economic divisor and the different possibilities for its design can be of vital importance 
especially in countries with a high degree of income inequality. 
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In this paper, we assess the redistribution (actuarial fairness) among subpopulations in 
NDC schemes using through the ratio between the present value of expected pensions received 
and contributions paid. Gender- and education-specific cohort life tables are also constructed 
for using in the computations of the annuity divisors and the expected lifetime income cash 
flows. We find that all subgroups of women and men with high educational attainment benefit 
from the use of the unisex demographic divisors – both the demographic and most of the 
economic divisors proposed. Surprisingly, when the survivor dividend is included, the present 
value ratio decreases for males when the retirement age increases as higher values of 
accumulated balances do not compensate for the shorter life span. Economic divisors depend 
on the composition of the population. In this paper, we show that when mortality differentials 
by gender and level of education are considered, the economic divisors are mostly driven by 
the longevity effect corresponding to gender. 
The paper is organised as follows; Section 2 describes the framework of a generic NDC 
scheme, including how to calculate notional capital and annuity divisors. This section also 
presents a simple example to illustrate the calculation of demographic and economic divisors. 
Section 3 presents the methodology to model mortality heterogeneity across socioeconomic 
groups. Section 4 discusses the measurement of income redistribution under the pension 
scheme with gender-neutral annuity pricing when heterogeneity in mortality exists in the 
population. The subsequent section provides a numerical illustration of the money’s worth for 
each subpopulation under different scenarios. The paper ends with the conclusion and contains 
two appendices in which we present mathematical formulae for the notional account balance 
and the annuity divisors and technical details on the ‘stratified Lee-Carter’ for mortality rates. 
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2. An NDC framework 
A generic NDC scheme, in principle, is a combination of a financial traditional defined 
contribution (DC) pension scheme and a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financing (i.e., contributions 
from current workers are used to pay for pension benefits of current pensioners). As in the 
common DC plan, participants contribute a fixed fraction of earnings throughout their working 
life; however, the account balances under the NDC system are fictitious (or notional) since no 
actual money is accumulated, and so the individual effectively acquires a series of individual 
claims on the public pension budget. The return on these contributions, in contrast to a financial 
defined contribution scheme, is a notional interest rate created by the government, generally 
linked to wage growth or GDP growth rather than a return on financial assets. 
 The amount of pension benefits under an NDC pension scheme is based on the concept 
of an individual lifetime account. At retirement, the amount of the account balance is converted 
into a lifetime pension according to standard actuarial practice. The initial pension at retirement 
is expressed in the general form as: 
 
  
     
 
Accumulated notional capital
Initial pension at retirement
Annuity divisor
=    (1) 
• Notional capital 
Under an NDC scheme, the individual notional account grows with new contributions plus 
(notional) returns on the account. Additionally, among countries implementing this system, 
only Sweden distributes the notional capital of persons who die during the accumulation phase 
to the account values of survivors belonging to the same birth cohort. This capital, known as 
‘inheritance gains’ or the ‘survivor dividend’, constitutes a part of the notional capital used to 
calculate the initial pension when people retire.6 Following Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá 
 
6 This entitlement, Chłoń-Domińczak et al. (2012), is different from the inheritance options in a pre-funded 
scheme, where the assets of deceased participants are distributed to inheritors. For more details of the survivor 
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(2014), the calculation of the accumulated capital at retirement age with both inclusion and 
non-inclusion of the survivor dividend is described in Appendix A1. In particular, see 
Equations (A1.1) and (A1.2) for technical details about the calculation of the accumulated 
notional capital with and without the inclusion of the survivor dividend. 
• Annuity divisors 
In this paper, we study two different types of annuity divisor. First, in Appendix A1, 
we describe the demographic divisor that takes into account the remaining future lifetime at 
retirement (Equation A1.4). In practice, the annuity divisors are equal for both genders, being 
based on unisex life tables for that cohort.7 Second, the Swedish NDC scheme is the only one 
where the economic divisor is applied to calculate the pension liability of retirees. For the 
calculation of the economic annuity divisor, both the size of pensions and the pay-out period 
are considered rather than the number of people who are surviving. The mathematical formula 
for the economic divisor associated with the expected number of years of pension 
disbursements is expressed in Equation (A1.5) of Appendix A1. 
• Calculation of divisors: an example with four periods 
This section presents a simple illustration of the calculation of the demographic and economic 
divisor for a cohort that joins the labour market at age 0. In this model, the demographic-
financial structure over time for this cohort is given by: 
1. Age: 
 
dividend in the Swedish NDC system, see Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá (2014), Arnold et al. (2016), and Vidal-
Meliá et al. (2016). 
7 The formulae of the annuity divisor are differentiated among countries; for example, in Latvia and Poland (called 
a G-value), this factor corresponds to the life expectancy of the retirees in the individual’s birth cohort at retirement 
age. In Italy and Sweden, the divisor includes the assumed rate of real GDP growth or wage growth with 1.5 
percent in Italy and 1.6 percent in Sweden, respectively (Chłoń-Domińczak et al. 2012).  
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 0, 1,⏞    
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠′ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠
2, 3⏟    
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠′ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠
 
2. The number of individuals at age 0 is 100. Unisex probability of survival at retirement age 
(i.e., age 2) is 1 while the probability of survival to age 3 is 0.5. All individuals are dead by age 
4. 
3. Average salary is constant and given by 100 monetary units. Contribution rate is equal to 
10% of salary. 
4. For simplicity we assume that the notional rate, the indexation rate of pensions, and the 
discount rate are equal to zero. 
Under this setting the total accumulated notional capital for all individuals at retirement age is 
equal to 20 and the unisex demographic annuity divisor is equal to 1.5.8 Consequently, the 
average pension per individual equals to 13.33. 
In practice, salaries and probabilities of survival are different among populations. We assume 
that the average salary for women is equal to 5 with a probability of survival to age 3 of 0.6 
while the average salary for men is 15 with a probability of survival to age 3 of 0.4. Also, we 
assume proportions of men and women in the population are equal. In this case, the 
accumulated salary per man (woman) is 30 (10) while the amount of the pension using the 
unisex annuity divisor is 20 (6.67). 
The economic divisor considers both differences in pension level and the composition of the 
population. In the economic divisor calculation, the probabilities of survival are weighted by 
the pension disbursements so this divisor represents the expected number of years of pension 
 
8 The unisex annuity divisor is calculated as 1+0.5=1.5 
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payments, i.e., 1.45.9 The amount of the pension would then increase for both men and women 
if the economic divisor is used. If the probability of survival for women (men) is 0.4 (0.6), the 
value of the economic divisor would be 1.55. Consequently, we can see that the composition 
of the population has an impact on the value of the divisor and on the amount of the pension 
paid to the individuals. With no differences in pension levels and in the composition of 
population among groups, both divisors should be equal. 
3. Modelling and forecasting mortality heterogeneity across socioeconomic groups 
Some studies have applied survival models under different mortality laws (e.g., Gompertz, 
Makeham, Perks and Makeham-Perks etc.) and generalised linear models to assess the level of 
mortality differentials but ignoring mortality improvement by socioeconomic profiles and 
projection of their future evolution.10 When projecting the heterogeneity in mortality between 
socioeconomic groups (e.g., income, occupation, or level of education) we need models that 
enable the capturing of both differentials in mortality levels and in mortality improvements 
between subpopulations. 
Several papers have used multiple population extensions of the Lee-Carter Model (Lee 
and Carter 1992) which allow mortality modelling and forecasting for two or more related 
populations simultaneously. For instance, some papers study the quantification of mortality 
differentials across countries (Li and Lee 2005; Li and Hardy 2011; Enchev et al. 2017), regions 
within a country (Debón et al. 2011; Danesi et al. 2015) or socioeconomic subgroups (Villegas 
and Haberman 2014; van Baal et al. 2016). 
The Joint-K model proposed by Carter and Lee (1992) assumes that mortality rates of 
all subpopulations are jointly driven by a single period index but the age-specific mortality 
pattern and the age-specific responses to changes in the level of mortality are subgroup-
 
9 The unisex economic divisor is calculated as 1+(6.67*0.6+20*0.4)/(6.67+20)=1.45 
10 See Richards (2008) and Madrigal et al. (2011), amongst others. 
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specific. Additionally, Villegas and Haberman (2014) has introduced a relative modelling 
approach where the mortality of socioeconomic subgroups is modelled relative to the mortality 
of a larger reference population—generally referred to the national population. Their finding 
concludes that mortality level differentials have a stronger impact on expectations of life and 
annuity values than mortality improvement differentials. 
In this paper, we employ the extension of the Lee-Carter model, known as the ‘stratified 
Lee-Carter’ model proposed by Debón et al (2011) to estimate and forecast age- and gender-
specific mortality rates across three levels of education. This model works even with small data 
sets.11 The model assumes that all subpopulations have the same mortality improvements at all 
times, described by the common factor x  and tK . In practice, it is unlikely that all subgroups 
would have the identical tendency; however, the assumption that related populations share a 
common time trend is the long run is reasonable when the available mortality statistics by 
educational attainment are limited.  
The stratified Lee-Carter model proposed by Debón et al (2011) can be transformed 
into the relative modelling approach associated with the reference (national) population and 
the subpopulation introduced by Haberman et al. (2014). 
The mortality of the reference population following the Lee-Carter Model can be 
expressed as follows: 
 , ,log x t x x t x tm K  = + +     (2) 
where the central mortality rate at age x  in calendar year t  for the reference population, 
,x tm , is computed as , , ,x t x t x tm D E= . We denote ,x tD  as the number of deaths of the reference 
 
11 Haberman et al. (2014) and Villegas et al. (2017) note the difficulties with the Joint-K model and the relative 
model approach when dealing with small data sets. In this case, the restricted available data on education-specific 
mortality rates make it difficult to fit reliably time series models with desirable mean reverting properties. 
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population aged x  who die in year t  before they reach age 1x+  and the number of person-
years of exposure to risk, ,x tE , is estimated by the mid-year population at age x  in calendar 
year t , equivalently to the average number of individuals aged x  over a year. The parameter 
x  describes the average age-specific mortality pattern. The variable tK  is a time-varying 
mortality index representing the overall change in the level of mortality in year t  and x  
measures deviation of the age-specific mortality level when the time index tK  changes. 
Given the reference population model and the ‘stratified Lee-Carter’ model with the same 
parameter x  and tK  for all populations, the mortality level differences of the subpopulation 
i  compared to the reference population for age group x  can be determined in the form of ix  
as follows: 
, ,log log
i i
x t x t xm m − =     (3) 
Using Equation (2), the mortality of the subpopulation i  can be specified through12 
    ,log
i i
x t x x x tm K  = + +     (4) 
with constraints 1x
x X


= ,   0t
t T
K

=   and  0
i
x
i I


=  for all x X  
where ,
i
x tm  is the central mortality rate at age x ,   1: ,..., kx X x x = , in calendar year 
t ,  1: ,..., nt T t t = , for subpopulation i ,  1: ,..., si I i i = , and , , ,
i i i
x t x t x tm D E= . The age-
specific mortality level in subgroup i  is 
i
x x + . The parameter x  represents the age-specific 
pattern of mortality change for all subpopulations and tK  is a single-period index driving the 
mortality trend for all subpopulations. Also, the subgroup i  is L  for low education, M  for 
medium education and H  for high education, respectively. In the Appendix A2 we present the 
 
12 See Villegas and Haberman (2014) in Equation (10). 
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procedure and technical details for the estimation and projections of the group-specific 
mortality rates and the construction of the cohort life tables. 
4. Measurement of income redistribution 
Under NDC pension schemes the amount of the pension depends on the accumulated notional 
capital together with the return it generates over the contributor’s working life. Therefore, 
NDCs narrow the ratio between benefits and contributions, achieving greater actuarial fairness 
than the traditional defined benefit schemes. Participants who have paid the same amount of 
contributions and retire at the same age should be entitled to the same pension benefits, while 
individuals with longer earnings histories or higher earnings who have been contributing more 
will receive higher benefits. 
A pension scheme is viewed as actuarially fair to an individual (or a group of 
individuals) with average mortality if the (expected) present value of lifetime contributions for 
this individual (or group of individuals) is equal to the (expected) present value of pension 
benefits. 
Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá (2014) and Alonso-García et al. (2017) have 
demonstrated that the NDC scheme considering the survivor dividend is actuarially fair—
pension rights are equivalent to contributions actually paid—on a cohort basis when the 
population is closed. Due to heterogeneity in mortality across the population, the use of unisex 
life expectancy as one factor of the actuarial divisor would introduce explicit income 
redistribution from high-mortality risk to low-mortality risk groups within the same generation 
(also known as an intra-generational redistribution). People who expect to live longer would 
get a higher return of the pension system than those who are expected to die earlier, given that 
they receive the same amount of initial pension at the same retirement age. 
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The measurement of lifetime redistribution from an individual’s perspective can be 
investigated through the difference between an individual’s lifetime contributions and lifetime 
retirement benefits - in this way, we would capture the money’s worth of participation in the 
pension system (Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held 2001; Bonenkamp 2009; Belloni and 
Maccheroni 2013). However, we use a variant based on the principle of relative equivalence, 
called the benefit to cost ratio (or present value ratio) defined as the ratio between the present 
value of benefits paid during retirement and the contributions paid during their working career 
(Brown 2002, 2003; Liebman 2002; Borella and Coda Moscarola 2006; Barnay 2007; 
Mazzaferro et al. 2012; Belloni and Maccheroni 2013). Thus, the ratio shows how much the 
benefit system returns to the participant for each Euro paid.  
A value of one indicates that the system is actuarially fair for an individual (i.e., she 
receives pension benefits which correspond to her contributions) — by definition, there is no 
redistribution towards or away from any person (Queisser and Whitehouse 2006). A value 
greater (lower) than one indicates that an individual receives more (less) than she has been 
contributing — an individual faces an expected gain (loss) from the pension system. 
The present value ratio (henceforth PVR) for a specific individual, with gender i  and 
level of education j , who pays scheme contributions for n  years throughout the working life 
and receives pension benefits ( )
,
,e
i j
x n k t n k
P
+ + + +
 at any age ex n k+ +  in year t n k+ +  for m  years 
from retirement age until the maximum age of surviving, is evaluated at the age of entry into 
the labour market ex  in year t  and is expressed as 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
11 1
, , *
, ,
, 0 0
, 11 1
, , , * ,
0 , , , ,
1 0
1
1
e e
e
e e e e
n km
i j i j
n k t hx t x n k t n k
i j k h
x t kn
i j i j i j i j
k t hx t x t x t x k t k
k h
p P r
PVR
p s p r s 
+ −− −
+ ++ + + +
= =
−− −
+ + +
= =
  +
=
  +  +  
 
 
  (5) 
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where ( )
,
,e
i j
k x t
p  denotes the probability that an individual with gender i and level of 
education  j, entering into the scheme at age ex  in year t  will be surviving at age ex k+  in year 
t k+ ; 𝑟𝑡+ℎ
∗  is the real discount rate in year t h+  and 
( )
,
,e
i j
x k t k
s
+ +
  is the contribution paid in 
year t k+  for an individual with gender i  and education j  at age ex k+ . The contribution is 
as a fixed fraction   of annual earnings (or salary) 
( )
,
,e
i j
x k t k
s
+ +
. 
5. Numerical illustration 
This section presents a numerical example based on the Swedish notional scheme to quantify 
the redistributive effects between subgroups within the same cohort when unisex divisors are 
used in the calculation of the initial pension. The sources of Swedish data for this illustration 
are discussed in the first sub-section while the results are presented in the second sub-section. 
We also provide a sensitivity analysis with respect to the underlying assumptions. 
The Swedish notional scheme is particularly interesting for several reasons. First, as stated in 
Section 2, Sweden is the only country that distributes the survivor dividend among survivors 
of the same birth cohort. Our paper also analyses the effects of the survivor dividend on 
actuarial fairness between individuals belonging to different groups. Second, the Swedish NDC 
scheme is the only one where the economic divisor is computed to calculate the pension 
liability to retirees. With this in mind, our paper also analyses the effect of using an economic 
divisor on the pension amount and studies different possibilities for the design of an economic 
divisor. 
5.1 Demographic and economic data and other assumptions related to the NDC scheme 
In this subsection, we first describe the demographic and economic data and then other 
assumptions related to the NDC scheme.  
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Demographic and economic data 
• The participants in this study are classified by gender and three groups of educational 
attainment: low, medium and high level of education.13 These persons have differences 
in terms of income profiles and survival probabilities which are the main factors for 
determining the direction and magnitude of the intra-generational transfers. 
• The cross-sectional average annual income for the Swedish population by age group, 
gender, and level of education in 2013 provided in the Eurostat Database is used.14 As 
shown in Figure 1, the pattern of age-earnings profile is an inverted U-shape where 
annual income increases in the early stages of a worker’s career, peaks around middle-
age and finally declines as a worker approaches retirement. Women earn less than men 
for all educational levels and the gender gap is wider for persons with high school 
education than for those with advanced degrees 
Figure 1 here. 
• The mortality data for this analysis consists of national mortality experience for 
calendar years 1960-2013 covering the age range 25-95 obtained from the Human 
Mortality Database (HMD), and the subpopulation dataset by educational attainment 
from Eurostat having a shorter observation period 2009-2013 with the age range 25-95. 
The set of calendar years of subpopulation data is a subset of the corresponding calendar 
years in the national population and the set of ages available within each subgroup is a 
subset of those available in the national population as well. 
Choice of parameters and other assumptions related to the NDC scheme 
 
13 According to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 2011) classification, Eurostat 
provides data by education in to three categories: 1) less than primary, primary and lower secondary education 
(levels 0-2); 2) Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3-4); and 3) Tertiary education 
(levels 5-8). We then refer those three groups as low, medium and high level of education, respectively. 
14 We consider the year of 2013 as the base year because the latest data on mortality by socioeconomic status 
(level of education) provided by Eurostat have been updated until this year. 
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In order to make the income redistribution comparable across subgroups, the main 
assumptions and the data sources used for this numerical example are as follows: 
• A participant joins the labour market at the age of ex = 25 in 2013 with a particular level 
of education, that does not change over her working life, and works continuously until 
retirement age. 
• The retirement age rx  is equal to 65. Therefore, a participant pays contributions for 
40n =  years as no unemployment is considered. 
• The maximum age that an individual can survive is 95 so the pension benefits are 
disbursed for 31m =  years.15  
• The contribution rate   is fixed at 16 percent of the individual’s earnings.16 
• The notional rate of return r , the discount rate credited in the annuity divisor r , the 
discount rate for the PVR *r , and the indexation rate   to revalue the pension benefits 
are each set equal to 1.6 percent and are assumed to be constant over time.17 In the case 
of the Swedish NDC scheme both the notional accounts and benefits are indexed in line 
with changes in average income.18 The system is front-loaded, i.e., benefits are 
calculated considering a discount rate of 1.6% in the annuity factor. Hence, the 
indexation of pensions is reduced during the pay-out time by subtracting 1.6% from the 
yearly income indexation.19 However, in our calculations we assume that the pensions 
are constant in real terms so that pensioners maintain their purchasing power. A 
 
15 This is the maximum age at which mortality data by level of education is available in the Eurostat Database. 
16 This value is in line with the contribution rate of the Swedish NDC system. 
17 In general, the notional rate, which is linked to the financial health of the system (i.e., GDP growth), is lower 
than the discount rate (dynamic efficiency). However, in that case, the PVR would be lower than one, as shown 
in Table 4: this result does not entail any intragenerational redistribution, but it implies that the individual faces a 
monetary loss from the pension system (the system is financially inefficient). 
18 The development of income is measured by the income index, which measures the change in average income 
for individuals who are active in the labour market. See the Swedish Pensions Agency (2019) for more details 
about the construction of the income index. 
19 In certain situations, Swedish Pensions Agency (2019), exceptions to the regular income indexation of accounts 
and benefits apply. These exceptions are governed by the ratio of assets to liabilities as provided in the legislation 
on the balancing mechanism. 
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sensitivity analysis of holding pensions constant in nominal terms is included in Table 
6. 
5.2 Results 
In this subsection, we present the results of forecasting mortality per socioeconomic groups 
and discuss the main results in terms of income redistribution from using the demographic and 
economic divisors. 
• Forecasting mortality across socioeconomic groups 
Statistics Sweden reported a period life expectancy at 65 in 2015 was 18.85 years for men and 
21.39 years for women. During the last ten years between 2006-2015, the period life 
expectancy for men has grown by 1.24 years, while the rise for women has been 0.68 years. 
There are also clear and growing differences in remaining life expectancy among education-
specific groups. Specifically, remaining life expectancy at age 65 for males (females) with only 
compulsory education has increased from 17.02 (20.22) in 2006 to 18 (20.48) in 2015 while 
the increase from males (females) with a degree is equal to 1.55 (0.94) (The Statistics Sweden, 
2016). Hence, in our analysis, it is important the incorporation of group-specific mortality rates.  
Figure 2 shows the estimated mortality rates in 2013 and projected rates in 2083 across 
subgroups by applying the ‘stratified Lee-Carter’ model.20 We can see that mortality across 
subgroups of males (females) is above (below) average mortality. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows 
that the average mortality rates for men and women are quite close to those with a medium 
level of education attainment and the mortality of men with high educational attainment and 
women with low attainment are almost equal to the rates for the overall population. 
 
20 We have also modelled the mortality rate considering mortality improvements among groups by using an 
extension of Lee and Carter (1992) known as the Joint-K model. However, due to the small data set, the forecasted 
rates have undesirable properties with, for example, the mortality rates of low-educated people being lower than 
those for medium-educated.  
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 By 2083, the age-specific mortality rates for all subgroups are projected to have 
continuously declined, while maintaining the existing patterns of mortality differentials. Also, 
because of the coherent approach to the modelling of mortality trends for subpopulations, 
independently for each gender, the projected future subgroup-specific mortality rates do not 
diverge in the long run and the education- and age-specific mortality rates for each gender 
deviate consistently from general (reference) mortality rates over time. 
Figure 2 here 
 
• Application of the demographic annuity divisor 
Under the conditions defined above, the unisex demographic annuity divisor for an individual 
aged 65 is equal to 24.2630 applying the Equation (A1.4). The values of this annuity divisor 
across subpopulations compared to the unisex annuity divisor are illustrated in Figure 3. It is 
noticeable that the values of the demographic divisors for all subgroups of women (men) are 
greater (lower) than the unisex. The values of the demographic annuity divisors across the 
subgroups have a pattern that is consistent with mortality.  
Figure 3 here 
 The money’s worth of the pension benefit for an individual who retires at age 65, given 
the unisex annuity divisor at 24.2630, is measured through the PVR as exhibited in Figure 4. 
When the survivor dividend is included in the calculation of the initial pension and if there is 
no heterogeneity in mortality across populations, the PVR is equal to one indicating that the 
individuals will receive pension benefits identical to what they have contributed over their 
working lives. 
 Considering differences in levels of mortality rates per groups, the PVR is higher for 
females than for males and it increases with the level of education attainment, ranging from 
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0.9024 for a low-educational attainment male to 1.1127 for a high-educated female worker. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that all subgroups of females benefit from the use of the unisex 
demographic divisor, i.e., the PVRs are higher than 1, as shown in Figure 4, which implies that 
they receive a pension transfer. However, the PVRs for most of the subgroups of males are less 
than 1, which implies that they pay for a pension transfer. 
A low-educational attainment male worker is the largest loser, with a PVR of 0.9024 
which is 4.96 percent less than the PVR for the average man and 9.76 percent less than the 
PVR for the average population, while a high-educational attainment male receives a transfer 
of income from the system of 1.54 percent.21 In contrast, all women obtain gains when the 
unisex demographic annuity divisor is used (i.e., 1.35 percent of transfer for a woman with a 
low educational level, 6.99 percent for a medium educational level, and 11.72 percent for a 
level of high education attainment). 
If the unisex demographic divisor is used, it is remarkable that gender has a larger 
impact on income redistribution as, even for women with low educational attainment, the PVR 
is higher than the case for the average population. 
In Figure 4, when the survivor dividend is not included in the calculation of the pension 
benefit, the PVR decreases by 4.37% for all subgroups. However, even without the inclusion 
of the survivor dividend, women—specifically with levels of medium and high education 
attainment—still benefit from the system with a PVR higher than one.22 
 
21 In the case of high-educated men, their specific annuity divisor is slightly lower than the unisex divisor but their 
PVR is above one. In this case, when using the fair rates for the subpopulation of this group, the divisor is equal 
to 24.1998 but the accumulated notional capital is lower as the mortality rates for this subgroup are slightly higher 
than for the general population. As a result, the amount of the pension slightly decreases to 11,933. On the other 
hand, when using the unisex rates, the divisor increases to 24.2630 but the amount of the accumulated notional 
capital is also increased – this makes the actual amount of the pension increase (12,117 EUR). 
22 The PVR being lower than one when the survivor dividend is not included does not necessarily reflect any 
intragenerational redistribution, but it can be caused because the efficiency loss from not including the dividend 
is greater than the intragenerational redistribution from which the individuals benefit. In fact, if the accumulated 
capital of the deceased person is not included in the pension calculation then the system is accumulating some 
reserves with no clear purposes. In Italy, Latvia and Poland, this money is not used and implicitly becomes a 
component of general public revenues. In Latvia and Poland, these revenues provide the required funding for 
some unfunded insurance commitments, i.e. legacy costs from the old pension system. Along the same lines, 
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Figure 4 here 
 
• Application of the economic annuity divisor 
The value of the economic divisor for a particular cohort corresponding to Equation (A1.5) 
depends on the population composition. Therefore, some plausible assumptions for the size of 
the different subgroups are needed. As stated in Section 2, the value of the economic divisor 
increases when the pension disbursement is higher, and the pay-out period is longer. 
Table 1 shows results when the number of females increases (decreases) by 20 percent 
with respect to the number of males (i.e., 1.2
ee
female male
x nx n
l l ++ =  or 0.8 ee
female male
x nx n
l l ++ = ), keeping an 
equal composition by level of education, that is, one third of the population for each level of 
education attainment. If we calculate the economic divisor only considering gender differences 
in mortality, we see that the value of the economic annuity (i.e., 24.4383) is higher than the 
demographic divisor when the number of women is larger since the number of years that 
pensions will be disbursed increases—women generally live longer than men. In contrast, when 
the number of women is smaller, the value of the economic divisor is lower than the 
demographic divisor. 
Consequently, as shown in Table 1, when the value of the economic divisor is higher 
(lower), both the amount of the pension and the PVR decrease (increase) compared to the case 
of using the unisex demographic annuity divisor. 
Table 1 here 
 
Arnold et al (2016) show that the reserves that an NDC scheme accumulates when it does not distribute the 
survivor dividend are much larger than the required amount to finance the longevity risk. Other uses of the survivor 
dividend could be the financing of a minimum pension or an orphan benefits, among others. 
 
 
 
22 
 
The economic annuity divisor depends on the different sizes of the socioeconomic 
groups in the total population. In the case that all individuals have a low level of educational 
attainment, the value of the economic divisor is lower (i.e., 23.5324) than the unisex 
demographic divisor, as illustrated in Table 2. The use of this economic divisor, that assumes 
that all individuals have low level of educational attainment, would provide a higher initial 
pension and consequently all subgroups would benefit from the application of the economic 
divisor. Conversely, the value of the economic divisor increases when its calculation assumes 
that all individuals have high level of educational attainment and thus the PVRs for all 
subpopulations decrease by 4.38 percent compared to the case of using the demographic 
annuity divisor. 
Table 2 here 
Table 3 extends Table 2 and assumes six different compositions of the population when 
calculating the economic divisor.23 As shown in Table 3, the values of the economic divisor 
increase with a high level of educational attainment in the population. Specifically, the lowest 
value of the economic divisor (i.e., 23.9604) results from a combination of males with medium 
educational attainment and females with low attainment. The values of the economic divisors 
increase with level of education and we can categorise the results into three groups depending 
on the combination of population structure: level of low and medium education (23.9604 and 
24.0983), the low and high education (24.5034 and 24.6203), and the medium and high 
education (24.9382 and 24.9489), respectively. 
Furthermore, we show that there are slight differences in the economic divisor values 
when the population consists of the same combination of levels of educational attainment 
regardless of gender. For example, the value of the economic divisor for the case of a 
 
23 Table 3 involves women with different education level from men while Table 2 assumes that both males and 
females have the same level of education. 
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population consisting of males with high educational attainment and females with low 
attainment, 24.5034, is quite similar to the case of males with a low attainment and females 
with a high level, 24.6203. With the same combination of education, the value of the economic 
divisor is lower for the case where women have a lower level of education than men due to 
their longer life expectancy. 
Notably, a lower value of the economic divisor produces a higher initial pension and it 
leads to higher values of PVR for all subgroups and vice versa. Although, the values of 
economic divisors vary depending on the population structure, females with medium and high 
educational attainment benefit from the system no matter which assumptions are used to 
calculate the divisor. 
Table 3 here 
5.3 Sensitivity analysis 
This section presents a sensitivity analysis of some variables that might affect the redistribution 
of the NDC scheme such as the retirement age, notional rate, discount rate and indexation of 
pensions in payment. A comparative statics framework is used, changing a single variable at a 
time. The results are illustrated only for the case of the unisex demographic divisor.24 
• Changes in retirement age 
As seen in Equations (A1.1), (A1.2) and (A1.4), when the retirement age increases, the 
accumulated notional capital increases and the demographic annuity divisor decreases due to a 
shorter remaining life expectancy. As a result, the amount of the initial pension increases but 
the effect on the PVR is not clear. When the survivor dividend is not distributed, the PVR 
would decrease if the retirement age is increases (see Figure 5b). 
 
24 Although the results of the sensitivity analysis using the economic divisor are different in absolute terms, the 
conclusions are the same as for the demographic divisor.  
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Surprisingly, when the survivor dividend is considered, Figure 5a, the PVRs for all 
subgroups of females increase with retirement age due to the higher value of the notional capital 
after the inclusion of the dividend. For males, we can see that the higher values of the 
accumulated balances—resulting in higher pensions—do not compensate for the shorter 
lifespan associated with a later retirement and therefore the PVRs decrease when the retirement 
age increases. 
Figure 5 here 
• Changes in notional rate of return 
Changes in the notional rate of return have a positive effect on the amount of the accumulated 
notional capital at retirement age and, as a result, on the direct change in the amount of the 
initial pension. The expected present value of pension benefits would also increase when the 
notional rate increases, while the expected present value of contribution payments remains 
unchanged. Consequently, the PVRs increase with (almost) the same percentage for all 
subgroups as shown in Table 4 and the results will be more favourable in terms of actuarial 
gains. 
Table 4 here 
• Changes in discount rate 
A higher discount rate will reduce the value of demographic annuity divisors and both the 
expected present value of contribution payments and pension benefits would decrease. This 
would lead to the reduction in the PVRs as exhibited in Table 5. The changes in the discount 
rate have a relatively larger effect on the pension rights of females than males and the same 
happens for individuals with high educational attainment relative to those with lower levels. 
When the discount rate increases to 2 percent, the cross-gender redistribution declines 
by 7.97 percent for males and by 8.33 percent for females and, considering the subgroups 
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among the female population, the PVR drops by 8.30 percent for individuals with low-
educational attainment and 8.41 percent for the ones with high levels. Therefore, an increase 
in the rate of discount brings about a greater loss for all subgroups of the population. 
Table 5 here 
• Changes in indexation rate 
We finally present the distributional effects if we change the rate of indexation used to adjust 
the amount of pension benefits in each year. A higher indexation rate gives higher values for 
the annuity divisor and, therefore, the amount of the initial pension would be lower. In 
particular, in the case that there is no indexation—the pension benefits remain constant over 
time— the unisex annuity divisor decreases from 24.2630 to 19.9924 as illustrated in Table 6.  
However, we show that the PVRs do not change in the same direction for males and 
females (i.e., PVRs decrease for males and increase for women when the rate of indexation of 
pension increases). This is due to the fact that the expected present value of pensions for women 
increases with increases in the value of the indexation rate since this group benefits from having 
a longer life expectancy than average. 
Table 6 here 
6. Conclusions 
The use of gender-neutral annuity divisor in the conversion of the accumulated notional capital 
into a lifetime annuity under the NDC pension scheme introduces an intra-generational income 
redistribution when heterogeneity in mortality exists in the population. This paper examines 
the redistributive effects across subpopulations—differentiated by gender and educational 
attainment—of using a unisex demographic annuity divisor, that is related to remaining life 
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expectancy, and an alternative divisor—namely the economic annuity divisor, that depends on 
the size of pension disbursements and the pay-out period. 
The value of the alternative divisor, used in Sweden to calculate pension liabilities, 
depends on the composition of the population. In this respect, for a particular gender or level 
of education, the value of the economic divisor tends to be higher if the pension system has a 
larger proportion of the population with low-mortality risk (i.e., females or people with high 
educational attainment). Moreover, we demonstrate that, when mortality differentials by 
gender and level of education are taken into account, the economic divisor is mostly driven by 
the longevity effect corresponding to gender. 
Income redistribution is measured through the concept of the money’s worth in respect 
of participation in the pension system on a lifetime basis. As expected, the numerical 
illustrations strongly confirm the expected transfer of wealth away from high-mortality risk 
groups to low-mortality risk groups. Also, all subgroups of women and men with high 
education attainment benefit from the use of unisex annuity divisors—both demographic and 
most of the economic divisors proposed—as their life spans are longer than the average life 
expectancy. This leads to present value ratios greater than the case for the average population.  
The other consequence of using the economic divisor is that, with changes in the value 
of the economic divisor, the amount of the initial pension and the PVRs would change in the 
opposite direction with the same relative percentage of change for all subgroups.  
In addition, the initial pension taking into account the survivor dividend would create 
an actuarially fair pension system—an individual will receive pension benefits equivalent to 
what she has been contributing over her working life—if there is no heterogeneity in mortality 
across subpopulations. Surprisingly, the survivor dividend also produces a trade-off between 
the PVRs for males and females at the different ages of retirement. Specifically, the PVRs for 
all subgroups of females increase if the retirement age is delayed due to the higher value of the 
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notional capital distributed which is increased by more capital from deceased participants. In 
contrast, the higher values of the accumulated balances for males do not compensate for the 
shorter life span associated with a later retirement and thus the PVRs decrease when the 
retirement age increases. Furthermore, the distribution of the survivor dividend would reduce 
the effect of differential mortality on the income transfer since the PVRs, when including the 
survivor dividend for all subgroups, are higher than those in the case without the survivor 
dividend. 
This paper evaluates income redistribution on a purely financial basis. One potential direction 
for future research would be to investigate the effect of mortality heterogeneity on the utility 
gains associated with the use of annuity divisors. Different policy options could also be 
designed along the contribution-benefit lifecycle with the aim of reducing the distributional 
effects of the system. There is a limitation of our methodology that we assume that everyone 
joins the labour market at the same entry age. Another avenue for future work would be to 
model the entry age for different groups of individuals together with its effects on life 
expectancy and actuarial fairness. Finally, as a third direction of future research, it would be 
interesting, following Lindbeck and Persson (2003), to measure the intragenerational 
redistribution on notional accounts excluding the effects of the financial inefficiency that might 
be inherent to the system. 
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APPENDIX 
A1. Mathematical formulae for the notional account balance and the annuity divisors 
• Notional capital, excluding the survivor dividend 
If the accumulated survivor dividend is not included, the accumulated notional capital at 
retirement age ex n+  in year t n+  for an individual with gender i  and level of education j , 
denoted as ( )
,
,e
i j
x n t n
K
+ +
, is calculated25 as 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
, ,
, ,
1
0
1
e e
n
i j i j
t hx n t n x k t k
h k
n
k
rK s
−
++ + + +
=
−
=
+=      (A1.1) 
where i  denotes the gender indicator with man ( )m and woman ( )w ; 
j  denotes the indicator with respect to educational attainment: low ( )L , medium ( )M
and high ( )H education; 
n  represents the number of year that contributions are paid from the age of entry into 
the labour market ex  in year t  until reaching retirement age ex n+  in year t n+ ; 
( )
,
,e
i j
x k t k
s
+ +
  is the contribution paid in year t k+  for an individual with gender i  and 
education j  at age ex k+ . The contribution is as a fixed fraction   of the annual earnings (or 
salary) 
( )
,
,e
i j
x k t k
s
+ +
; 
t hr +  is the annual (notional) rate of return in year t h+ . 
• Notional capital, including the survivor dividend 
If the survivor dividend is included, then the amount of notional capital at retirement increases 
in line with the accumulated survivor dividend at retirement age. The accumulated notional 
 
25 Contributions and pension benefits are assumed to be payable yearly in advance. 
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capital including the survivor dividend at retirement age ex n+  in year t n+  for an individual 
with gender i  and level of education j , denoted ( )
* ,
,e
i j
x n t n
K
+ +
, is calculated as 
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where ( ),e
ac
x n t n
D + +  is the accumulated survivor dividend at retirement age for an 
individual who has contributed for n  years since entering the system; 
( ),ex k t k
s + + is the average salary for an individual aged ex k+  in year t k+ ; 
( ),en k x k t k
p− + +  is the probability that an individual aged ex k+  in year t k+  will be alive 
at age ex n+  in year t n+ . 
• Demographic annuity divisor 
The demographic annuity divisor is equivalent to the present value of a whole life annuity-due 
at retirement age ex n+  in year t n+  and is calculated as 
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where pension benefits are disbursed for m  years from the retirement age until the 
maximum age that an individual can survive. The pensions settled after the first payment are 
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revalued by the indexation rate, t n h + +  and discounted with the technical interest rate t n hr + + . 
Also, ( ),ex n k t n k
l + + + +  is the number of individuals surviving at age ex n k+ +  in year t n k+ + . 
• Economic annuity divisor26 
According to Swedish Pensions Agency (2019), the formula for the demographic annuity 
divisor is modified to get the formula for the economic divisor. The economic divisor at 
retirement age ex n+  in year t n+  on a birth cohort basis, denoted by ( ),ex n t n
ED + + , is calculated 
as 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
* *
11
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( )
*
,ex n k t n k
l + + + +  represents the total pension disbursements at time t n k+ +  for all retirees 
at age ex n k+ + ; 
( ),ex n t n
P + +  is the average initial pension at retirement age, and the amount of pension 
benefit is indexed. 
A2. Procedure to model and forecasting mortality rates across subpopulation using the 
‘stratified Lee-Carter’ model 
We fit the ‘stratified Lee-Carter’ model presented in Equation (3) for unisex, male and 
female groups separately by the method of maximum likelihood. The resulting parameter 
estimates are shown graphically in Figure A1. Then, the single-period mortality index tK  is 
 
26 See formula B.7.5 in Appendix B, Swedish Pensions Agency (2019). 
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forecasted by a univariate autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) process and is 
used to generate projected life tables. 
Figure A1 here 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and 
Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) are used to evaluate the best model that fits the historical 
data. The estimated parameters, their standard errors and values of goodness-of-fit statistics for 
unisex and both genders appear in Table A1. The t-statistics of all parameters are statistically 
significant, and the residual plots guide us towards retaining the chosen models. Thus, the time 
series of index tK  for all population (unisex) and female are modelled by an ARIMA (0,1,1) 
process: 
1 1 1t t t tK K    − −= + + +     (A2.1) 
while, for males, the model is as an ARIMA (1,1,2) process: 
( )1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2t t t t t t tK K K K      − − − − −= + + + − + +   (A2.2) 
where the constant   indicates the average annual change of tK , j represents the thj   moving 
average parameter, j  is the thj  autoregressive  and the error term t  is normally distributed 
with zero mean and variance 
2 . 
Table A1 here 
Next, the ARIMA(0,1,1) for unisex and female mortality and the ARIMA(1,1,2) for 
male mortality are used to generate the forecasts of the mortality index tK  during the period 
2014-2083. Figure A2 shows the past values of tK  along with the projected values and 
associated 95 percent confidence intervals for unisex, male and female, respectively. 
Figure A2 here 
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The estimated parameters from the ‘stratified Lee-Carter’ model in Equation (3) are 
used to compute estimated age- and gender-specific mortality rates by subgroup i  in 2013 as 
follows: 
( ),2013 2013ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ expi ix x x xm K  = + +    (A2.3) 
Also, given the above estimated mortality rates ,2013ˆ
i
xm and the resulting forecasts of 
 2013 : 1,2,...,70sK s+ = , the forecasted mortality rates for subpopulation i  are calculated as 
( ) ,2013 ,2013 2013 2013ˆ ˆˆ expi ix s x x sm m K K+ += −    (A2.4) 
The projected mortality rates ,
i
x tm  are converted into ,
i
x tq , i.e.,  probability of an 
individual aged x  in the calendar year t  and subgroup i  dying within one year (also called the 
one-year probability of death). These probabilities are used to construct the life tables.  
Let xf be the average number of years lived within the age interval  ), 1x x+  for people 
dying at that age. Following Renshaw and Haberman (2003) and Wilmoth et al. (2007), we fix 
1
2
xf =  for all single ages. Hence, the approximation of  ,
i
x tq  is expressed as 
    
( )
,
,
,1 1
i
x ti
x t i
x x t
m
q
f m

+ −
    (A2.5) 
for 25,26,...,94x =  and  95, 1
i
tq =  in the calendar year 2013,2014,...,2083t = . 
The elements of the matrix of ,
i
x tq  whose rows correspond to ages and columns to 
calendar years can be simplified as in Table A2 (Pitacco et al., 2009). For a diagonal 
arrangement,  
25, 26, 1 25 ,, ,..., ,...
i i i
t t s t sq q q+ + +     (A2.6) 
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corresponding to a sequence of cohort life tables, with each table referring to the cohort born 
in year 25t − . We use the values of  25,2013 26,2014 95,2083, ,...,i i tq q q to construct the subgroup-
specific projected cohort life tables of an individual aged 25 in 2013 (equivalent to  a life who 
was born in 1988). 
Table A2 here 
Let 
i
xp  be the probability that an individual in subgroup i  survives from age x  to 1x+
to complete the subgroup-specific life table calculations. Therefore, 
1i ix xp q= −      (A2.7) 
for all ages x .  
Let the radix of the life table be 25 100,000
il = . Then, the number of survivors at age x  
is     
1
, 25
25
x
i i i
x t h
h
l l p
−
=
=      (A2.8) 
and the distribution of deaths by age in the life table population is  
    
i i i
x x xd l q=       (A2.9) 
Lastly, the projected cohort subgroup-specific life tables for the people who were born 
in 1988 are constructed to calculate the money’s worth ratio and the unisex life table is used to 
compute the unisex (average) annuity divisors. 
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Figure 1 Age-earnings profile estimates during working life, age 25-69 by gender and level of 
education (in EUR) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations derived from Eurostat Database (2017). 
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Figure 2 Evolution of mortality rates across gender and three levels of education  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations derived from Human Mortality Database (2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Figure 3 Annuity divisors under the baseline assumptions by gender and education 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 4 PVR across subpopulations in the cases of notional capital including and excluding 
survivor dividend 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 5 PVR when using unisex demographic divisor with different retirement ages in the 
case of including and excluding survivor dividend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Results are based on the main assumptions, but retirement ages vary between 61-70. 
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Figure A1 Parameter estimates of the ‘stratified Lee-Carter’ model for unisex, male and female 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations derived from Human Mortality Database (2017) and Eurostat 
Database (2017). 
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Figure A2 Forecasts of the mortality index tK with 95% confident interval 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The prediction intervals are not used in our analysis but we are aware that these are very narrow in some 
cases. This is a feature of some of the ARIMA models selected and it would be improved by considering the effect 
of parameter uncertainty through the use of boot-strapping. 
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Table 1 PVR for different subgroups when only gender differences in mortality taking into 
account in the calculation of the divisors 
Sup-group 
Demographic 
divisor 
Unisex economic divisor 
Females < Males Females = Males Females > Males 
Divisor 24.2630 24.1725 24.3186 24.4383 
PVR and % relative change       
Men 0.9495 0.9530 0.37% 0.9473 -0.23% 0.9427 -0.72% 
M-L 0.9024 0.9058 0.37% 0.9003 -0.23% 0.8959 -0.72% 
M-M 0.9566 0.9602 0.37% 0.9544 -0.23% 0.9497 -0.72% 
M-H 1.0154 1.0192 0.37% 1.0131 -0.23% 1.0081 -0.72% 
Women 1.0640 1.0680 0.37% 1.0616 -0.23% 1.0564 -0.72% 
W-L 1.0135 1.0173 0.37% 1.0112 -0.23% 1.0062 -0.72% 
W-M 1.0699 1.0739 0.37% 1.0675 -0.23% 1.0623 -0.72% 
W-H 1.1172 1.1214 0.37% 1.1146 -0.23% 1.1092 -0.72% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 2 PVR for different subgroups when all individuals are considered to have the same 
education level (low, medium or high education) for the calculation of the economic divisor 
Sup-group 
Demographic 
divisor 
Unisex economic divisor 
Low education 
Medium 
education 
High education 
Divisor 24.2630 23.5324 24.4664 25.3731 
PVR and % relative change       
Men 0.9495 0.9789 3.10% 0.9416 -0.83% 0.9079 -4.38% 
M-L 0.9024 0.9304 3.10% 0.8949 -0.83% 0.8629 -4.38% 
M-M 0.9566 0.9863 3.10% 0.9486 -0.83% 0.9147 -4.38% 
M-H 1.0154 1.0469 3.10% 1.0069 -0.83% 0.9710 -4.38% 
Women 1.0640 1.0971 3.10% 1.0552 -0.83% 1.0175 -4.38% 
W-L 1.0135 1.0450 3.10% 1.0051 -0.83% 0.9692 -4.38% 
W-M 1.0699 1.1032 3.10% 1.0610 -0.83% 1.0231 -4.38% 
W-H 1.1172 1.1519 3.10% 1.1079 -0.83% 1.0683 -4.38% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3 PVR for different subgroups when six different combinations of population are 
considered for the calculation of the economic divisor 
Sub-
group 
Demographic 
divisor 
Unisex economic divisor 
ML&WM ML&WH MM&WL MM&WH MH&WL MH&WM 
Divisor 24.2630 24.0983 24.6203 23.9604 24.9489 24.5034 24.9382 
PVR 
Men 0.9495 0.9560 0.9357 0.9615 0.9234 0.9401 0.9238 
M-L 0.9024 0.9085 0.8893 0.9138 0.8776 0.8935 0.8779 
M-M 0.9566 0.9631 0.9427 0.9687 0.9303 0.9472 0.9307 
M-H 1.0154 1.0223 1.0006 1.0282 0.9875 1.0054 0.9879 
Women 1.0640 1.0713 1.0486 1.0775 1.0348 1.0536 1.0352 
W-L 1.0135 1.0204 0.9988 1.0263 0.9857 1.0036 0.9861 
W-M 1.0699 1.0772 1.0544 1.0834 1.0405 1.0594 1.0410 
W-H 1.1172 1.1248 1.1010 1.1313 1.0865 1.1062 1.0869 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: (1) ML&WM – all men are low-educated and all women are medium-educated; (2) ML&WH – all men are 
low-educated and all women are high-educated; (3) MM&WL – all men are medium-educated and all women are 
low-educated; (4) MM&WH – all men are medium-educated and all women are high-educated; (5) MH&WL – 
all men are high-educated and all women are low-educated; (6) MH&WM – all men are high-educated and all 
women are medium-educated. 
Table 4 PVR with different notional rates and % of relative change compared to the case of 
using demographic divisor under the main assumptions with 1.6% of notional rate 
Sub-group 
Demographic 
divisor 
Notional rate 
1% 2% 3% 
Divisor 24.2630 24.2630 24.2630 24.2630 
PVR and % relative change       
Men 0.9495 0.8380 -11.74% 1.0340 8.91% 1.2891 35.78% 
M-L 0.9024 0.7965 -11.74% 0.9828 8.91% 1.2252 35.78% 
M-M 0.9566 0.8443 -11.74% 1.0418 8.91% 1.2988 35.78% 
M-H 1.0154 0.8962 -11.74% 1.1058 8.91% 1.3786 35.78% 
Women 1.0640 0.9393 -11.72% 1.1587 8.90% 1.4441 35.72% 
W-L 1.0135 0.8947 -11.72% 1.1037 8.90% 1.3755 35.72% 
W-M 1.0699 0.9445 -11.72% 1.1651 8.90% 1.4521 35.72% 
W-H 1.1172 0.9862 -11.72% 1.2166 8.90% 1.5162 35.72% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5 PVR with different discount rates and % relative change compared to the case of using 
demographic divisor under the main assumptions with 1.6% discount rate 
Sub-group 
Demographic 
divisor 
Discount rate 
1% 2% 3% 
Divisor 24.2630 26.1943 23.0914 20.5127 
PVR and % relative change       
Men 0.9495 1.0719 12.89% 0.8738 -7.97% 0.7047 -25.78% 
M-L 0.9024 1.0181 12.83% 0.8308 -7.94% 0.6706 -25.69% 
M-M 0.9566 1.0805 12.95% 0.8801 -8.00% 0.7091 -25.87% 
M-H 1.0154 1.1486 13.12% 0.9332 -8.09% 0.7502 -26.11% 
Women 1.0640 1.2086 13.59% 0.9754 -8.33% 0.7793 -26.76% 
W-L 1.0135 1.1506 13.52% 0.9294 -8.30% 0.7433 -26.66% 
W-M 1.0699 1.2158 13.63% 0.9806 -8.35% 0.7830 -26.81% 
W-H 1.1172 1.2708 13.75% 1.0232 -8.41% 0.8157 -26.98% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 6 PVR with different indexation rates and % relative change compared to the case of 
using demographic divisor under the main assumptions with 1.6% of indexation rate 
Sub-group 
Demographic 
divisor 
Indexation rate 
0% 1% 2% 3% 
Divisor 24.2630 19.9924 22.5277 25.5208 29.0658 
PVR and % relative change         
Men 0.9495 0.9578 0.88% 0.9527 0.34% 0.9472 -0.23% 0.9415 -0.84% 
M-L 0.9024 0.9133 1.21% 0.9066 0.47% 0.8995 -0.32% 0.8921 -1.14% 
M-M 0.9566 0.9638 0.75% 0.9594 0.29% 0.9547 -0.20% 0.9497 -0.72% 
M-H 1.0154 1.0181 0.27% 1.0165 0.11% 1.0146 -0.07% 1.0126 -0.27% 
Women 1.0640 1.0563 -0.73% 1.0610 -0.28% 1.0661 0.19% 1.0713 0.68% 
W-L 1.0135 1.0091 -0.44% 1.0118 -0.17% 1.0147 0.12% 1.0177 0.41% 
W-M 1.0699 1.0612 -0.82% 1.0666 -0.31% 1.0722 0.21% 1.0782 0.77% 
W-H 1.1172 1.1043 -1.15% 1.1122 -0.44% 1.1206 0.30% 1.1293 1.08% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A1 Parameters estimation of the ARIMA ( , , )p d q model 
Variable 
Unisex ARIMA(0,1,1) Male ARIMA(1,1,2) Female ARIMA(0,1,1) 
Coeff. 
Std. 
Error 
t-Stat Coeff. 
Std. 
Error 
t-Stat Coeff. 
Std. 
Error 
t-Stat 
  -1.03 0.09 -11.23 -0.92 0.47 -1.98 -1.08 0.05 -20.64 
1  -0.47 0.10 -4.71 -1.43 0.12 -11.83 -0.72 0.10 -7.12 
2  - - - 0.61 0.09 6.62 - - - 
1  - - - 0.95 0.05 18.84 - - - 
2  1.62 1.40 1.80 
log-likelihood -87.01 -82.90 -90.05 
AIC 180.01 175.79 186.11 
BIC 185.92 185.64 192.02 
RMSE 1.235 1.128 1.302 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table A2 One-year probabilities of death in a dynamic context 
 t t+1 … t+70 
25 25,
i
tq  25, 1
i
tq +  
… 
25, 70
i
tq +  
26 26,
i
tq  26, 1
i
tq +  
… 
26, 70
i
tq +  
… … … … … 
x ,
i
x tq  , 1
i
x tq +  
… 
, 70
i
x tq +  
x+1 1,
i
x tq +  1, 1
i
x tq + +  
… 
1, 70
i
x tq + +  
… … … …  
95 95,
i
tq  95, 1
i
tq +  
… 
95, 70
i
tq +  
Source: Authors’ illustrations. 
